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Federal Bankruptcy Act: Section
Twenty-nine
ALBERT LlvTT*
The federal bankruptcy act' has been in existence a little over a
quarter of a century. During that time surprisingly few cases have
been brought under section twenty-nine of the statute which deals
with offenses against the bankruptcy act.2 Not all of the provisions
of this section have been brought into litigation and courts have not
yet construed many of these provisions. Nor can any help be found
from the cases decided under the prior bankruptcy act 3 as the present
section differs so very much from the parallel section in the earlier
act.4 The writer, therefore, will be compelled to rely, in many in-
stances, upon the bare words of the text, and upon general principles
applicable to those words, in analysing and construing the existing
provisions.
The subdivisions of the section will be considered in the order in
which they appear in Section Twenty-Nine.
I
Subdivision "a." "A person shall be punished, by imprison-
ment for a period not to exceed five years, upon conviction of the
offense of having knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to
his own use, embezzled, spent, or unlawfully transferred any
property or secreted or destroyed any document belonging to a
bankrupt estate which came into his charge as trustee."
(i) The exact wording of the statute would seem to make it obvious
that the subdivision applies only to the trustee in bankruptcy.
But when reference is made to section one of the Bankruptcy Act
a fair question is raised as to whether it applies also to those who
participate with the trustee in the forbidden conduct or not. Sec-
tion one deals with definitions of terms used in the statute. Sub-
division nineteen of section one states that "persons" shall include,
"... when used with reference to the commission of acts which are
herein forbidden" those "who are participants in the forbidden acts."
*Professor of Law in Washington and Lee University Law School.
'Act of July 1, 1898, Ch. 541; 30 Stats. at Large 544. For an historical in-
troduction to the Bankruptcy Act see Wiliston, Cases in Bankruptcy, pp. 1-4.
'A list of cases dealing with offenses against the Bankruptcy Act is given as an
appendix to this article. The list is of the date of December 15, 1925.3Collier on Bankruptcy, p. 56e. (Tenth Edition.)
4See act of 1867 par. 45 et seg. R. S. par. 5132.
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Suppose that the trustee in bankruptcy spends money belonging
to the estate in bankruptcy through an agent who knows that the
money belongs to the estate in bankruptcy and yet willingly
assists the trustee to spend the money. It is submitted that
such an agent or any one who aids the trustee in doing any of
the acts which the trustee is forbidden to do would be amenable to
punishment in the same way that any one who aids a bankrupt to
conceal his assets is deemed to be a participant in the acts of the
bankrupt.5
As a de facto trustee in bankruptcy has all the rights and duties of
a de jure trustee6 this section of the statute applies to him also.
(ii) Six offenses are created by subdivision "a." These are:
(i) Knowingly and fraudulently appropriating to one's own use
property belonging to the estate of the bankrupt.
(2) Knowingly and fraudulently embezzling7 property belonging to
the estate of the bankrupt.
(3) Knowingly and fraudulently spending property belonging to
the estate of the bankrupt.
The foregoing three provisions are clear and self explanatory.
Their evident purpose is to prevent the trustee from using any of
the bankrupt's property for his own enrichment. He takes the
property as a fiduciary. He holds it for the benefit of the creditors.
He operates with it as an arm of the bankruptcy court. To utilize
the property for his own benefit would be to deprive the creditors of
what is their just due and to abuse the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act under color of office. This the law cannot permit. The trustee's
compensation is fixed. He cannot receive more than what the statute
allows.73
No reported cases relating to the foregoing provisions have been
found although diligent search has been made.
(4) Knowingly, fraudulently and unlawfully transferring any prop-
erty belonging to the estate in bankruptcy.
This provision does not prevent the transfer of property by the
trustee in the proper performance of his legal duties or in the exercise
of his legal rights or privileges.8 It is specifically directed towards
5U. S. v. Young and Holland Co., I7o Fed. i1O (19o9). Certiorari denied 225
U. S. 710 (1912).6Sharfsin v. U. S., 265 Fed. 916 (1920). But compare Gilbertson v. U. S., 168
Fed. 672 (19o9).7 1t is not the purpose of the writer to discuss the nature of offenses which are
entirely clear to those dealing with criminal law, except when peculiar elements
are presented by the Bankruptcy Act.7aSee Bankruptcy Act, sec. 72.8See Bankruptcy Act sections 47, 70.
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
"unlawful" transfers. An unlawful transfer is a transfer which is not
within the powers conferred upon the trustee by the Bankruptcy
Act.9
The word "transfer" has been defined in the Bankruptcy Act as
follows:
"'Transfer' shall include the sale and every other and differ-
ent mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the posses-
sion of property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment,
pledge, mortgage, gift or security.' ' 0°
This definition is obviously intended to include every conceivable
method of passing title to, or possession of, property. It applies to
absolute and conditional transactions. The word "sale" simply
indicates one method of passing title and possession. The phrase
"as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift or security" indicates other
types of transactions, and has been held to be illustrative of the
methods in the minds of Congress and not as excluding other types
of transactions." The phrase "and every other and different mode"
is, with the exception of sales, all-inclusive. It applies to every type
of transaction which passes title or possession. The intent of Con-
gress is too plain to admit of any mistake.
(5) Knowingly and fraudulently secreting any document belonging
to the estate in bankruptcy.
To secrete a document means to hide it away from any person who
is lawfully entitled to see or to possess it.12 The Bankruptcy Act
states that " 'document' shall include any book, deed or instrument
in writing.' i
(6) Knowingly and fraudulently destroying any document belong-
ing to the estate in bankruptcy.
The foregoing two provisions (5) and (6), are clear and, in the main,
self-explanatory. Their obvious purpose is to prevent the secretion
or destruction of any documents which may be of value in settling
the estate in bankruptcy and in safeguarding the rights of the credi-
tors, the rights of the bankrupt and the proper functioning of the
Court. But an interesting question arises as to the meaning of the
word "document." Is the definition in the Bankruptcy Act illus-
trative of the meaning or is it exclusive? Are books, deeds and
instruments in writing the only documents not to be concealed or
destroyed? Does the phrase "instrument in writing" include letters
Ibid.
10Bankruptcy Act Sec. 1 (25).
"For a discussion of this term see Collier on Bankruptcy p. 13. (Tenth Edi-
tion.)
"Webster; International Dictionary, "Secrete."
"Bank. Act Sec. 1 (13).
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
and memoranda of various kinds? Ordinarily documents include
letters, memoranda and various writings.14 Usually instruments in
writing are not inclusive of letters and memoranda. 15 If the definition
of the Bankruptcy Act is illustrative then letters and memoranda
are documents. But if the definition is exclusive then letters and
memoranda are probably not documents. The distinction would be
of importance in a case like the following:
Suppose that a bankrupt has concealed property and that the
only clue to the existence of the concealed property consists of some
rough memoranda and business, or private, letters which the bank-
rupt has inadvertently failed to remove or destroy. The trustee in
examining the papers of the bankrupt finds these writings. He decides
to appropriate the concealed property to his own use. To aid him
in this he secretes or destroys the memoranda and the letters. Can
he be indicted for secreting or destroying a "document?"
If the definition in the Bankruptcy Act is illustrative, or if the
phrase "instrument in writing" is interpreted by the court to include
memoranda and letters, the indictment will lie. But if the definition
is exclusive and the court refuses to interpret the phrase "instrument
in writing" to include letters and memoranda the indictment will
be bad.
No reported case has been found which decides this question. It
is submitted, however, that when the case arises the courts will
follow the method used in interpreting the word "transfer" already
discussed above, 6 and hold that the indictment will lie and thus ful-
fill the purpose of the statute, which is to hold the trustee to absolute
honesty in carrying out his duties as trustee.
This leads to the final aspect of the subdivision. The prohibition
extends only to property and documents which come to the trustee
in his official capacity "as trustee." This means, of course, during
the entire time that he is acting as trustee. Any property or docu-
ments which he receives during his incumbency must be accounted
for and properly used.
Punishment for violation of this subdivision is imprisonment for
a term not to exceed five years.
2
Subdivision"b." "A person shall be punished, by imprison-
ment for a period not to exceed two years, upon conviction of
the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently (i) concealed
while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee any of
1419 C. J. 382; Cf. In re Hess, 134 Fed. io, iii, (i9o5).
1532 C. J. 946. But see Loch v. Mayer, ioo N. Y. Supp. 837 (19o6).
'
6See supra, n. iii.
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the property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy; or (2) made
a false oath or account in, or in relation to, any proceeding in
bankruptcy; (3) presented under oath any false claim for proof
against the estate of a bankrupt, or used any such claim in com-
position personally or by agent, proxy, or attorney, or as agent,
proxy, or attorney; or (4) received any material amount of
property from a bankrupt after the filing of the petition, with
intent to defeat this Act; or (5) extorted or attempted to ex-
tort any money or property from any person as a considera-
tion for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceed-
ings."
A. (i) Subsection (i) applies to a person who is a bankrupt '7 and to
a person who has been a bankrupt and has received his discharge.' 8
It does not apply to a person who is not or has not been a bankrupt.19
This is of particular importance because the offense of concealing
assets cannot occur except "while" the accused is a bankrupt, or
"after his discharge" in bankruptcy. It cannot be committed by a
person before he has been a bankrupt. Yet some of the decided
cases show, as we shall indicate, that the courts have either departed
from the express provisions of the statute or have defined the term
"conceal" so as to conserve what they consider to be the spirit of
the statute.
(ii) Subsection (i) is directed against the concealment of assets be-
longing to the estate in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act states
that " 'conceal' shall include secrete, falsify and mutilate."20  It is
submitted that this definition is illustrative and not exclusive. The
word "secrete" is a synonym for "conceal." It is a commonplace
of logic that definitions in terms of synonyms are not adequate
definitions. To say that "conceal" means "secrete" is to say that
"1conceal" means "conceal" and we are back to where we started.
Congress cannot be held to have intended an absurdity, so we may
assume that the word "secrete" was used in its primary sense of
meaning "to hide away." But hiding away, or withdrawing from
view, is but one method of concealing.
Suppose this case: Part of the assets of the bankrupt is a certified
17U. S. v. Lake, 129 Fed. 499 (1904); Field v. U. S. 137 Fed. 6 (I9O5); U. S. v.
Rhodes, 212 Fed. 513 (1913); U. S. v. Rosenstein, 211 Fed. 738 (914); U. S. v.
Greenbaum 252 Fed.259 (1918); Tugendhaft v.U.S. 263 Fed. 562 (1920); Barron
v. U. S., 5 Fed. (2d) 799 (1925).
18Greenbaum v. U. S., 280 Fed. 474 (1922). This is a case of composition with
creditors, but the court holds that a composition with creditors has the same
result as a discharge in bankruptcy under the Banlruptcy Act.
IgGilbertson v. U. S., 168 Fed. 672, (I909); Tugendhaft v. U. S. 263 Fed. 562
(1920), (semble). Cf. Connetto v. U. S. 251 Fed. 42 (1918). Aiders and abettors
need not be bankrupt. U. S. v. Young and Holland Co., 17o Fed. iio (I9O9).20Bank. Act. sec. I, (22).
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check for five thousand dollars. The bankrupt takes the check and
wraps it around the suspension cord of the electric light that hangs
directly over his desk, and in plain sight of everyone. His intent is
to keep that check from the trustee in bankruptcy. He is relying
upon the well-known psychological fact that few people ever see
what is actually within their view. The trustee takes over the desk
of the bankrupt as his working desk. Several months go by. The
trustee fails to see the check. The bankrupt is discharged. The
statute of limitations runs its period. The bankrupt takes down the
check and uses it for his own purposes. It can hardly be doubted that
the act of the bankrupt in wrapping the check around the electric
light cord was within the intendment of the statute. Yet by no
stretch of the word "secrete" can he be said to have secreted the
check. And he certainly did not falsify or mutilate it. But one
meaning of the word "conceal" is "to withhold knowledge of." That
is certainly what the bankrupt did. He withheld knowledge of the
check's existence from the trustee. Hence he did "conceal" the
check while he was a bankrupt. The courts apparently treat the
definition in the Bankruptcy Act as illustrative and not exclusive of
other methods of concealment. In Glass v. United States,2 1 the court
said that the same construction must be given to the word "conceal"
in the subsection we are considering as is given to the word in Sec-
tion 14 (b) of the Bankruptcy act which deals with reasons for
withholding a discharge in bankruptcy. 2  Each section is deemed to
deal with the same thing though in different ways and with different
objects in view.22'
In U. S. v. Greenbaumn the court said:
"The gist of the offense charged against defendant is the
knowing and fraudulent withholding of property by him, while
a bankrupt from his trustee.... Whether such a conceal-
ment was accomplished by secreting, falsifying, mutilating or
through other means is entirely immaterial. The object of
this statute is the protection of creditors from unscrupulous
debtors, willing to evade the payment of just debts by wrong-
fully failing to turn over to the bankruptcy court property
which in justice and law no longer belongs to them. Congress
has wisely declared such conduct to be a criminal offense, and
21231 Fed. 65 (1916).22See In re Dauchy, 122 Fed. 688, 693 (i9o3); Cf. U. S. v. One Stradivarius
Violin, 188 Fed. 542, 543 (1911). See also U.S.v. One Stradivarius Kieserwetter
Violin, i97 Fed. 157, 159 (1912).22aThe difference between the two sections is a difference in the proof which is
required. In the civil action the preponderance of proof is enough to establish
concealment, but in the criminal prosecution the concealment must be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt.
23252 Fed. 259 (ii8), at p. 264.
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the courts ought so far as possible to give effect to the obvious
meaning of the statute."
In Connelto v. United States,24 the court, in dealing with the sufficien-
cy of an indictment for concealing assets, said:
"The concealment is alleged to have consisted in the failure of
the accused to deliver the property to the trustee, or to account
for the same, or to disclose their possession thereof and thereby
concealment from the trustee was charged and the completion of
the offense was sufficiently set forth."
In United States v. Rhodes the court in dealing with a conspiracy
to conceal assets said: " 'Conceal' is the withholding of assets with
fraudulent intent."
It would seem, therefore, that concealment consists of secreting,
falsifying, mutilating, and withholding of property, or of information
concerning the whereabouts of property, in any manner whatever.
This idea is strengthened by the fact that the bankrupt is under a
duty to turn over all his property to the trustee.26 The title to the
property vests in the trustee as of the date of the adjudication.27
The bankrupt is deemed to be a bankrupt as of the date of the filing
of the petition. 8 It would follow, therefore, that the duty to reveal2s
all his property is imposed upon the bankrupt as of the date of the
petition, when the petition is a voluntary one, or the time when the
schedule is filed when the petition is an involuntary one. This is
probably what the court had in mind, in United States v. Goldstein, 9
when it said:
"It is true that clause i applies to concealing property from the
trustee, and that in the case at bar the alleged concealment was
prior to the appointment of the trustee. But when a person
files his voluntary petition in bankruptcy he knows that a trustee
will be appointed and that such trustee takes as of the date of
the adjudication. It follows that a concealment of property after
the adjudication, even if before the appointment of the trustee,
is a concealment from the trustee."
Some of the courts, however, have not kept the proper definition
of the word "conceal" clearly in mind. They have muddled up the
law by bringing in the phrase "continuous concealment" which has
no sanction whatever from the terms of the Bankruptcy Act and is
A25I Fed. 42, 44, (1918).
2 2 12 Fed. 523(1913).2
'Bank. Act, Sec. 7 (8).27Bank. Act, Sec. 7oa. See Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 (1913).23Ibid.
28aSee dissenting opinion of Buffington, J., in Gretsch v. U. S. 231 -Fed. 57,(I916).
29132 Fed. 789 (1904) at p. 792.
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not at all necessary to reach the conclusions which they have reached
in the specific cases before them for decision.
In Johnson v. United States,30 the court said:
"The offense (of concealment) is not making a misrepresen-
tation at a given time and place; it is the continuous conceal-
ment of the property from the trustee during the whole of the
bankruptcy proceedings or beyond."
In Glass v. United States,3 the language of the court was:
"By concealment of property the act contemplates a continu-
ous concealment in instances where property is physically con-
verted and concealed before bankruptcy and remains secreted
and concealed after bankruptcy."
In United States v. Rhodes,3" the court said:
"A criminal concealment of property by a bankrupt is a con-
tinuous concealment of property from the trustee."
In the Johnson case and the Glass case the court was dealing with
the situation where the accused had concealed some of his property
before the petition had been filed or he had been adjudged to be a
bankrupt. In each case the facts indicated that the concealment
was made in contemplation of bankruptcy and with the evident in-
tent to defraud creditors. The courts were in a dilemma. It seemed
as though the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act had been violated. But
the Act specifically stated that the concealment had to be made
"while a bankrupt" or after discharge in bankruptcy. It could not
be made before bankruptcy. Yet in the instant cases the conceal-
ment had actually been made before bankruptcy. In the Glass case
the court was under the further embarrassment of having just de-
cided, on the day before, that "concealment is a positive thing com-
mitted at some time or other with respect to a physical thing."-"
In making this statement they had refused to accept the argument
of Buffington, J., who contended that concealment meant failure to
reveal the whereabouts of the property, in a vigorous and, it is sub-
mitted, a sound opinion. In both cases the majority of the court
held to the idea that concealment meant hiding away, secreting.
This was their fundamental error. To get away from the fact that
the secreting had occurred before bankruptcy they turned to the
notion of a "continuous concealment." And this in spite of the fact
that in the case of Warren v. United States,3 4 which was decided four
30163 Fed. 30, 33 (1908).
3'231 Fed. 65, 67 (1916).
32212 Fed. 513, 516 (1913).
3U. S. v. Gretsch, 231 Fed. 57 was decided on March 24, 1916. Glass v. U. S.
231 Fed. 65, was decided by the same court on March 25, 1916.U199 Fed. 753 (1912).
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years earlier, the court had distinctly pointed out that mere passivity
on the part of the bankrupt after he had concealed the property was
not enough to create a "continuous concealment" and had said that:
"The fact that concealed property remains concealed does
not continue the offense of concealing it, for the continuance of
the results of a crime does not continue the crime."35
In the Johnson case the court was dealing with a conspiracy to
conceal assets. It is easy to see how natural it was for the court to
make the obvious, though false, analogy to the idea of a continuing
conspiracy."
It is submitted that the idea of a "continuous concealment" is
opposed to both the spirit and the express language of the statute,
as the following considerations will show.
The Bankruptcy Act is not concerning itself with the entire business
life-time of the bankrupt prior to his adjudication as a bankrupt. It
is interested in his acts only if they occurred within four months prior
to his adjudication. He cannot be petitioned into bankruptcy for
anything he has done more than four months before the date of the
petition. 7 There are two conditions precedent which must exist
before the petitioning creditor can have the debtor declared a bank-
rupt. The first is that there must be an act of bankruptcy and the
second is that it must have occurred within four months prior to the
filing of the petition. One of the acts of the debtor which will be
considered to be an act of bankruptcy is the concealing, or destroy-
ing, of assets with the intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud his credit-
ors." '3 8 But this concealment is simply one of the acts which allow
the creditor the privilege of petitioning the debtor into bankruptcy.
It is not the concealment with which the penal section of the statute
is concerned. The earliest time when that concealment can occur
is when the debtor has become a bankrupt within the meaning of
the statute. Before that time his concealments are not criminal,
they are not offenses against the Bankruptcy Act. Under no defini-
tion of the term "conceal" can the acts of the non-bankrupt debtor
be brought under the statute. If he hides the property before he is
a bankrupt the hiding is over when done. Thereafter it exists only
as any completed action exists in the universe. But the mere exist-
15lbid at p. 756.
'
6For cases dealing with continuing conspiracy see U. S. v. Kissel, 218 U.S.
6oi (i91o); Crawford v. U. S., 212 U. S. 183 (19o8); Hyde v. U. S. 225 U. S.
347 (igii). For a case dealing with conspiracy to conceal assetsofa corporation
in bankruptcy see Roukous v. U. S. 195 Fed. 353 (1912).
:"Bankruptcy Act Sec. 3 b. See 17 C. J. p. 173.28Bank. Act, 3 a (i).
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ence of a hiding made previous to bankruptcy, is not penalized by
the Bankruptcy Act. The hiding must occur "while a bankrupt" or
thereafter. At the most the only "continuous concealment" with
which the Bankruptcy Act is concerned is a concealment which began
with bankruptcy. And the only meaning which "continuous con-
cealment" can have is that an act has been done, which is forbidden
by the statute, and the consequence of which are that the trustee
is not getting that to which he is legally entitled as trustee. It may
very well be that "conceal" as used in the statute is intended to in-
clude not only the act of concealing but also the natural and probable
consequences of that concealing. It may also be the intendment of
the statute to hold the bankrupt criminally responsible for those
natural and probable consequences. But they must be the natural
and probable consequences of the act of a bankrupt. They cannot be
the results of the act of a non-bankrupt. The language of the statute
is explicit in this regard. There can be no "continuous concealment"
under the statute if "conceal" means "secrete."
Suppose, however, that "conceal" means to withhold information
concerning the property. Can there be a "continuous concealment"
in that situation? If the concealment occurred before bankruptcy
then it is outside the purview of the statute. A non-bankrupt may
withhold any information he pleases. The Bankruptcy Act does not
deal with him. It imposes no duty upon him to reveal his property
or information concerning it. But if the concealment occurred while
the accused was a bankrupt and he fails-to reveal the whereabouts
of his property during the time that the estate in bankruptcy is being
administered then the phrase "continuous concealment" may be a
fairly accurate description of the legal situation, provided, that the
courts are dealing with an oimssion and not with an act. This dis-
tinction is important. For an act changes a pre-existing situation
while an omission allows the pre-existing situation to go on. If a
bankrupt conceals property and then does nothing he is continuously
failing to reveal that which he ought to reveal. But what is meant
by "continuously" is a series of omissions. At every moment of
time during the administration in bankruptcy, of the bankrupt's
estate, the bankrupt is under a duty to reveal all his property. He
is under a duty to act, to change the pre-existing state of ignorance
on the part of the trustee of the whereabouts of the bankrupt's
property. His failure to act at any given moment is a violation of
the statute. There is a single duty covering the entire time of ad-
ministration; but this duty may be breached a number of successive
times. A series of consecutive breaches looked at, as a matter of
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convenience, as a whole may be termed, somewhat inaccurately, a
"continuous concealment."
But in this case the phrase is an unnecessary one. It needlessly
complicates a simple situation. So far as the members of theseries of
omissions existed before bankruptcy they are outside of the statute.
No judicial interpretation of a term can properly bring them within
the statute. So far as the series of omissions exist during bankruptcy
any one of the series is a breach of the duty to reveal and there is no
need to talk of a "continuous concealment." Not even the statute
of limitations, as we shall indicate later, stands in the way of the
fullest utilization of the spirit and express language of the statute to
fulfill the purpose of the statute.
The true situation is that some of the courts have tried to read
into the statute provisions for a situation which Congress has not
dealt with. There is no provision for the criminal prosecution of a
person who gets rid of his property, with intent to defraud his credit-
ors, before, but with definite anticipation of, being declared a bank-
rupt. Some provision to meet this situation should be made. But
it is not the function of the courts to make it. The idea of a "con-
tinuous concealment" has been used by some of the courts to do that
which Congress has not done but which Congress, probably, should
do.
Other courts have kept closer to the spirit and intent of the statute
and refused to allow convictions unless the concealment occurred
while the accused was a bankrupt.9
(iii) The bankrupt is forbidden to conceal "any of the property be-
longing to his estate in bankruptcy." This raises the question:
"Which property belongs to the estate in bankruptcy?" The answer
is: All the property which the bankrupt has belongs to his estate in
bankruptcy. It is true that he is entitled to claim such exemptions
as the state law allows him.40 But this claim must be made at the
time he presents his schedules. 41 He must reveal all the property he
has. It is for the bankruptcy court to allow him his exemptions as
provided for by law. The fact that the trustee does not take title
to the exempted property as of the date when the debtor was ad-
judged to be a bankrupt 4 a does not release the debtor from revealing
in his schedule the property which he claims as exempt. Indeed, it is
'See U. S. v. Goldstein, 132 Fed. 789 (1904); Kern v. U. S. 169 Fed. 617
(19o9); Warren v. U. S., 399 Fed. 753 (1912); Schonfeld v. U. S. 277 Fed. 934
(I921).
40 Bank. Act, Section 6.4lfbid Section 7 (8).41albid Section 7oa.
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difficult to see how the debtor can claim any exemptions unless he
indicates that he has the property which he wishes to be included as
exempt property.
A case is conceivable, however, where the question might properly
arise. Suppose this case: The state statute allows the debtor an
exemption of fifty dollars in cash. The debtor happens to have that
sum of money in cash in his home. He fails to include the fifty
dollars in his schedule of assets. But he does not put in any claim
for exemptions, thinking that as he has the fifty dollars to which he
would be legally entitled the matter is at an end. Has he violated
the statute? Probably not. It was not a fraudulent concealment.
The omission can be remedied by amending the schedule.42
(iv) The debtor is prohibited from concealing any of his assets
"from his trustee." Does this mean that there can be no criminal
concealment until a trustee has been appointed? Probably not. In
the United States v. Goldstein 4l the court definitely said that the con-
cealment of assets after the debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt
but before the trustee had been appointed was a criminal conceal-
ment. This is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. For, the
trustee takes title to the property as of the date of the petition in
bankruptcy. He is entitled to know of what the estate consisted at
that time. It is the duty of the debtor to tell him. This notion is
supported by the fact that the debtor if he becomes a voluntary bank-
rupt must file his schedule of assets with his petition, and if he is
petitioned into involuntary bankruptcy he must file the schedule
within ten days after the petition is filed, unless the court allows him
a longer time.4 The obvious intention of the Bankruptcy Act is to
give the trustee the fullest information concerning the assets of
the debtor.
It is to be noted, however, that there can be concealment only of
the property to which the trustee is entitled as trustee.43 The trustee
is not entitled to property held by the bankrupt as trust property
for some one else;45 nor to powers which the bankrupt may exercise
on behalf of some one else. 6 But the fact that the debtor does not
know that a trustee has been appointed, nor what his name is, does
not release the debtor from revealing his assets to him nor negative
OGretsch v. U. S., 231 Fed. 57 (1916).
41U. S. v. Goldstein, 132 Fed. 789 (1904).
"Bank. Act, Section 7.
"aCf. Malvin v. U. S. 252 Fed. 449 (1918).
"Miller v. U. S., 277 Fed. 721. (1921).
4"Bank. Act, section 7o a (3).
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criminal concealment. 47  It has been held that an honest belief on
the part of the debtor that there is no concealment does not prevent
the crime of concealment from being consummated.48 But it is sub-
mitted that a criminal intent cannot exist when the debtor does not
believe that he is concealing. In that case an honest concealment by
the debtor could not be a fraudulent concealment and so the offense
denounced by the statute would not be committed.
The use to which the bankrupt puts the concealed property is im-
material. Applying the concealed goods to the paying of a preferred
creditor 9 or to the payment of other legitimate debts50 does not pre-
vent the crime from being consummated. Qualms of conscience
which compel confession and disclosure of concealed assets come too
late if they come after the concealment has been made.oa If-new
and correct schedules are put in they do not relate back to the time
of the original schedules. °b
Concealment by the bankrupt can occur even if there is no demand
for the property by the trustee,5' as the statute does not make such
demand an element of the offense.5 2 If the trustee hears rumors,
that some property of the bankrupt has been concealed, some time
before he is appointed trustee and he makes no effort to find the goods
for some time after his appointment as trustee, the bankrupt is not
excused and the criminal concealment is not negatived.
As in all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proving that there
has been a criminal concealment of assets in bankruptcy rests upon
the State. Proof is made out by showing that the bankrupt has failed
to include the assets in his schedule.54 Proof of concealment of any
part of property or cash is all that is requisite for conviction.55 But
proof of concealment cannot rest upon a presumption." That the
bankrupt had money in his possession just prior to bankruptcy does
not establish the fact that he possessed it at the time of bankruptcy.5 7
47U. S. v. Comstock, 161 Fed. 644 (19o8).
4"Miller v. U. S. 277 Fed. 721 (1921) conspiracy to conceal assets in bank-
ruptcy.
"Kalin v. U. S., 2 Fed. (2d) 58 (1924).
60U. S. v. Lowenstein, 126 Fed. 884 (1904); Corenman v. U. S., 188 Fed. 424
(i9ix); Miller v. U. S., 277 Fed. 721 (1921).
l'aReinstein v. U. S. 282 Fed. 214 (1922).
5('bKem v. U. S. i69 Fed. 617 (1909).
"Warren v. U. S., i99 Fed. 753, (1912); Meyer v. U. S. 220 Fed. 822 (1915);
Kahn v. U. S., 2 Fed. (2d) 58 (1924).
:'See sutpra, n. 51. Cf. In re Smith 112 Fed. 509 (I902).
"Barron v. U. S., 5 Fed. (2d) 799 (1925).
54U. S. v. Stern, 186 Fed. 854 (1911). Cf. Paszkiewicz v. U. S. 3 Fed. (2d)
272 (1924).
5Ibid.
5OIn re Stem, 215 Fed. 979 (1914).
"Ibid. But it is not error to introduce evidence of value of bankrupts stock
before and after filing of petition to prove concealment; Jacobs v. U. S., 16i
Fed. 694 (1908).
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Nor is concealment made out by shorwing that the bankrupt removed
property just prior to bankruptcy.5
The usual rules of law governing the validity of an indictment53
apply to indictments for concealing assets in bankruptcy. An indict-
ment following the language of the statute is good.5 9 The word
"conceal" charges every element of the offense as it is defined, as in
the statute, to mean "secrete, falsify and mutilate."6 0 When coupled,
in an indictment, with the words "unlawfully, knowingly and fradu-
lently" the word "conceal" clearly excludes unintentional acts."
The method of concealment need not be set out." Nor need the in-
dictment set out which of the three things, "secrete, falsify and mu-
tilate," was done." An allegation of the ownership of the goods con-
cealed is unnecessary.64 And there need not be an averment that the
accused knew that the assets he concealed belonged to his estate in
bankruptcy.- But the indictment must allege that a trustee had
been appointed, that property had been concealed, that the property
were assets of the accused in bankruptcy, and that the property had
been concealed from the trustee in bankruptcy. 6
(v) Section i (ig) of the Bankruptcy Act states that:
"'Persons' shall include corporations, except where other-
wise specified, and officers, partnerships and women, and when
used with reference to the commission of acts which are herein
forbidden shall include persons who are participants in the for-
bidden acts, and the agents, officers and members of the board
of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of
corporations."
It is obvious that the intent of Congress was to make provision for
68Bean v. U. S., 192 Fed. 859 (1912). For a case dealing with law of "purging
by oath" in relation to the law of concealment of assets in contempt cases see,
In re Lasky, 163 Fed. 99 (I9O8).
HSaSee Beale, Criminal Pleading and Practice, Part Two.
6U. S. v. Greenbaum, 252 Fed. 259 (118); Meyer V. U. S. 22oFed. 822 (1915).
60U. S. v. Greenbaum, 252 Fed. 259 (1918).
61U. S. v. Rhodes, 212 Fed.- 513 (i1913).
12U. S. v. Comstock, ift Fed. 644, (1908); U. S. v. Greenbaum, 252 ]Fed. 259
(1918); U. S. v. Rhodes, 212 Fed. 513 (191,3).
11U. S. v. Comstock, 161 Fed. 644 (igo8).
"Ibid.
""The charge that the accused did unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully and fraudu-
lently conceal from his trustees etc., certain property belonging to the estate in
bankruptcy, and which said property was in his hands and possession etc.,
carries with it a sufficient averment that the accused knew that the property he
was charged with concealing belonged to his estate in bankruptcy." McNiel v.
U. S. i5o Fed. 82, 85 (i9o9).
OU. S. v. Grant, i Fed. (2d) 723 (1924). For relatedpointsseeU.S.v.Rosen-
stein, 211 Fed. 738, (1914); Tugendhaft v. U. S. 263 Fed. 562, (1920); Connetto
U. S. 251 Fed. 42, (I918); Ulmer v. U. S., 219 Fed. 641 (11.5); U. S. v. Freed,
179 Fed. 236, (19IO); U. S. v. Coyle, 229 Fed. 256, (1916); Bartlett v. U. S. io6
Fed. 884 (90l).
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getting at those who were actually carrying out the activities of
organizations which were legal entities apart from the human beings
connected with the legal entities. A partnership can act only through
the partners or the agents of the partnership appointed by the part-
ners. A corporation can act only through its officers, boards, agents
and those appointed by them. To say that a corporation or a part-
nership can commit a crime means simply that the law looks through
the corporate or partnership entity to those who are its agents,
officers, etc., and holds the corporation responsible, so far as it can
be punished, for the acts of its representatives. If, therefore, any
person acting on behalf of the corporation or partnership commits
a crime the corporation or partnership is said to commit the crime.
Put shortly the rule is: A corporation can commit a crime.67 Under
Section 29 (b) (i) of the Bankruptcy Act some special difficulty
was thought to be presented because it is provided that only a bank-
rupt can commit the offense of concealing assets in bankruptcy.
In Field v. U. S. ,68 the question was squarely raised as to whether
an officer of a corporation could be indicted for concealing assets of
the corporation. The facts were that the corporation became bank-
rupt. F. was vice-president of the corporation. He himself was not
bankrupt. But he concealed assets of the bankrupt corporation
from the trustee in bankruptcy. He was indicted and convicted.
On appeal the question was whether the conviction was proper under
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the conviction was improper. Sanborn, C. J., said:
"The act specifically designates the persons liable to the pun-
ishment which it prescribes. They are those who commit the
offense denounced while they are bankrupt, or after they have
received their discharge in bankruptcy. Under a familiar ruling
this specification by the statute of those who are bankrupts,
and those who have been bankrupts, as the persons liable to the
punishment, necessarily excludes all others from that liability,
and no other person can be lawfully punished under this section
for the offense it denounces. As the plaintiff in error was not
and never had been a bankrupt, it is difficult to perceive how he
could have been guilty of the offense of having concealed while
a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee, any of his
estate in bankruptcy."6 9
The learned Chief Justice refuses to accept the argument that sec-
tion i (I9) broadened the scope of section 29 (b). "Present or past
bankruptcy," he said, "is an essential attribute of every person who
*Ti Bishop on Criminal Law sec. 417-24. (Ninth Edition.)
8137 Fed. 6 (i905).56 Ibid at p. 6.
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
may be an offender under this statute. ' 70 He insisted upon it that
a penal statute must be strictly construed and that therefore an
officer of a corporation could not be guilty of concealing the assets
of his bankrupt corporation.
It is submitted that the learned Chief Justice was in error. He was
looking at the officer of the corporation as an individual. But the
Bankruptcy Act makes him into an instrumentality used by the cor-
poration. He cannot be guilty of concealing his own assets in bank-
ruptcy unless he is, or has been, a bankrupt. But he can conceal the
assets of a corporation in bankruptcy because the statute says so. Not
his bankruptcy but the bankruptcy of the corporation is the essential
attribute of the offense of concealing the assets of a bankrupt cor-
poration. Otherwise the learned Chief Justice is compelled to take
the position that a corporation cannot ever commit the offense of
concealing its assets while a bankrupt. For, the bankruptcy of an
officer of a corporation is not the bankruptcy of the corporation.
He as an individual is a distinct and separate legal entity from the
corporation. For the same reason, the bankruptcy of the corpora-
tion is certainly not the bankruptcy of the officer. A corporation
cannot conceal its assets without the acts of its officers, etc. The cor-
poration cannot even become bankrupt without the actions of its
officers, etc. After the acts of the officers, etc., have made the cor-
poration bankrupt there can be no concealment of its assets in bank-
ruptcy unless an officer etc., does the concealing. But the statute
says quite clearly that a corporation can conceal its assets in bank-
ruptcy. This can only be because the acts of the officer, etc., plus the
bankruptcy of the corporation are taken to mean the concealment of
the assets of the corporation "while a bankrupt."
But it may be argued, that the fact that a corporation conceals its
assets in bankruptcy by means of its officers, etc., does not indicate
that the officer violates the statute and should be punished therefore.
It is the corporation which violates the statute and should be pun-
ished for its own wrongdoing. If the Congress meant to prohibit an
officer of a corporation from concealing the assets of the corporation,
while bankrupt, it should have so stated in the statute.
The answer to this is two-fold. In the first place, the statute ex-
pressly says that with reference "to the commission of acts which
are herein forbidden" persons shall include "agents, officers, and
members of the boards of directors, etc.". It seems hardly reason-
able, indeed it would be highly ludicrous, to contend that Congress
7OIbid at p. 7.
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meant by this language that the officer inself had to be a bankrupt
at the time the corporation was bankrupt before he could be a par-
ticipant in the forbidden act, by the bankrupt corporation, of con-
cealing its assets in bankruptcy.
In the second place, the penalty for the offense of concealing assets
in bankruptcy is "imprisonment for a period not to exceed two
years." A corporation cannot be imprisoned. Is there to be no
punishment for a corporation that conceals assets in bankruptcy?
Where is the sense of designating a corporation as a possible offender
when there is no way of getting at it for the offenses it commits. It
would be futile. But you can imprison an officer of a corporation.
All the purposes of a penal statute, punitive, preventive and deterrent,
could be fostered by punishing an officer of a corporation who takes
corporate assets and hides them from the trustee in bankruptcy.
Section 2 (4) of the Bankruptcy Act gives the courts of bankruptcy
jurisdiction over such offenders and empowers their punishment.
Under a familiar rule of interpretation it is clear that where one inter-
pretation of the Bankruptcy Act would lead to nullification and the
other would lead to carrying out the spirit and the express provisions
of the act it is the latter interpretation which should prevail.
This is what has been done in later decisions. The courts have
refused to follow Field v. United States. Five years after the Field
case was decided, it was held in United States v. Freed,70 that the presi-
dent of a bankrupt corporation could be convicted if he participated
in the concealment of the assets of the bankrupt corporation even
though he himself was not bankrupt.7 ' In Wolf v. U. S.72 the court
flatly held that the president of a bankrupt corporation could be
convicted for concealing the assets of the corporation, though the
accused was not convicted because of lack of evidence that he had
concealed the assets.
In several cases of conspiracy to conceal assets of a bankrupt cor-
poration the courts have held that the one who conceals the assets
of the bankrupt corporation need not himself be bankrupt. The
courts seem to rely on Section 332 of the Penal Code of 19lo (U. S.).73
This section reads as follows:
"Whoevet directly commits any act constituting an offense
defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is a principal."
71U. S. v. Freed, i79 Fed. 236 (191o). Hand, D. 3., considered Field v.U. S.
137 Fed. 6, (905) as not binding after the decision in Cohen v. U. S. 170 Fed.
715, (19o9). But it is submitted there is nothing in the latter case to discredit the
Field Case.
72238 Fed. 902 (2926).
"Comp. Stat. par. ro5o6.
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In United States v. Young and Holland Company 4 the court had
to decide whether one who was not a bankrupt but who had aided
in concealing the assets of a bankrupt could be indicted under Sec-
tion 29 (b) (i) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court decided that he
could, saying:
"It (the section) is applicable not only to a bankrupt but also
to all persons who unite with the bankrupt as participants in
the act which is made an offense by the statute.... The term
'participants in the forbidden acts' seems an appropriate ex-
pression designed to cover persons who join with a bankrupt
in the commission of offenses created by chapter 4, section 29,
and framed in view of the rule that those who are present aid-
ing, commanding or abetting are deemed principals."
The court further held that a corporation may be guilty of conceal-
ing assets while a bankrupt.75
B. (i) Subsection (2) applies to any person who makes a false oath
in or in relation to any proceedings in bankruptcy.7 5
The Bankruptcy Act defines "oath" as including affirmations. 6
It further provides that,
"Any person conscientiously opposed to taking an oath may,
in lieu thereof, affirm. Any person who shall affirm falsely
shall be punished as for the making of a false oath. '77
The purpose of the statute is to penalize any false statements made
under oath or under affirmation if they are part of or in relation to
proceedings in bankruptcy. It is not confined to statements made
by the bankrupt only. "Any person" means every person. Nor
need the one making the statement be bankrupt. His solvency or
insolvency is immaterial.
(ii) The statements may be made before any person who is legally
qualified to make inquiries into the conditions of the bankrupt's
estate in bankruptcy. 77 a Provided that the inquiries made are
material to the proceedings in bankruptcy, inquiries may be made
concerning any transactions no matter how long before the adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy they may have occurred. 78 It is not requisite
7417o2Fed. iio (i909).75It is to be noted that a writ of certiorari was denied in this case in 225 U. S.7io (1912). See Barron v. U. S. 5 Fed. (2d) 799 (1925); Kauffmanv.U.S.,212
Fed. 613 (1914).7
aSee also Bank. Act Section 2ob which reads "Any person conscientiously
opposed to taking an oath may, in lieu thereof, affirm. Any person who shall
affirm falsely shall be punished as for the making of a false oath." See Bartlett v.
U. S. io6 Fed. 884 (I9oi).78Section i (17).
"1See supra n. 75a. Edelstein v. U. S. x49 Fed. 636 (i9o6).
77albiM.
78U. S.rv. Rosenstein, 211 Fed. 738 (1914); Edelstein v. U. S., 149 Fed. 636
(igo6).
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to conviction that the statement made be in writing and subscribed
to.79 The statements may be oral.8d
(iii) The offense is committed when the bankrupt makes verifica-
tion to a false schedule of assets, 81 or fails to include some of his assets
in the schedule which he swears to.8 2 It is also the offense of making
a false oath if the bankrupt makes the assertion that his account
books had been destroyed by fire when he actually had them safe in
his home," or if he says that he has used some of his assets to pay off
debts when he had not done so8 or that he had been held up and
robbed when in fact he had not.8 It is to be noted that if the same
question is put several times, but in varying form, the several answers
are not each a separate offense but are to be taken together as making
up one offense only.86
(iv) Some cases have discussed the relation of the statute making
perjury a federal criminal offense to the offense of making false oath
in bankruptcy proceedings. The federal Criminal Code, Sec. 125
reads as follows:
"Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person in any case in which a law of the United States
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, de-
clare, depose or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed, is true,
shall wilfully and contrary to such oath state or subscribe any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty
of perjury, and shall be fined not more than two thousand dol-
lars and imprisoned not more than five years."187
In Wechsler v. U. S.,18 W. was adjudged to be a bankrupt. While
giving testimony under oath concerning certain of his business trans-
actions he lied. He was indicted for perjury under R. S. 5392 (now
the section above quoted), and convicted. He sued out a writ of
error and his conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court held that W.'s offense came under both the Bankruptcy
Act and R. S. 5392. It further added that it was immaterial under
which statute the prosecution was brought as the court would put
79Barron v. U. S. 5 Fed. (2d) 799 (1925).$0Edelstein v. U. S., note 77 supra.
4U. S.v. Lake, 129 Fed. 499 (19o4); Kernv. U.S. 169 Fed. 617 ( *909); Gretsch
v.U. S., 231 Fed. 57 (x916).
82U. S. v. Gray, 255 Fed. 98 (1918); Gordon v. U. S. 5 Fed. (2d) 943 (1925).
63KOValoff V. U. S. 202 Fed. 475 (1912).
B4Kahn v. U. S. 214 Fed. 54 (V914).
asSchonfeld v. U. S. 277 Fed. 934 (1921); Ulmier v. U. S. 229 Fed. 641 (19M);
Kahn V. U. S., 214 Fed. 54 (1914).
BaUlmer v. U. S. 219 Fed. 641 (1925). Certiorari denied 238 U. S. 638.
67Penal Code zxg, Ch. 321, see. 125; U. S. Comup. Stats, par. 1029,5.
8158 Fed. 579 (1907).
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
the prosecution under the proper statute if the prosecuting attorney
had made a mistake in this matter.89
In Ulmer v. United States,0 the facts were as follows:
The X Firm were tenants of U. When the firm first went into
business they made a deposit with the Y sank of $2000 in cash.
U gave the film a check for $z5oo. The firm drew three checks
in his favor. The firm became bankrupt and was investigated
by a referee in bankruptcy. He though that the deposit of the
check given by U to the X Firm was colorable and that it was
simply an exchange of checks to make it appear that the firm
had a larger deposit in the bank that it really did have. U was
called before the referee to testify in the matter. He declared
that he received $i5oo in cash from the X Firm when he gave
them his check for that amount. This was found to be false.
He was indicted for perjury.
It was contended for the defense that the indictment could be
brought only under section 125 of the Federal Penal Code. But the
court held that the prosecution was well brought under the Bank-
ruptcy Act and followed Wechsler v. United States, discussed above.
In Rosenthal v. United States,91 R. swore falsely in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. He was indicted for violating the Bankruptcy Act and
also for violating the Federal Penal Code section 125. The question
was whether there could be an offense under both statutes. The
court held that there could not be, and said:
"Congress was undoubtedly of the opinion that false swearing
in bankruptcy proceedings is not equal in enormity to the crime
of perjury, as the punishment for false swearing in a proceeding
in bankruptcy is less severe, and the time within which the pro-
secution must be instituted two years less than for the crime of
perjury under section 125 P. C."9"
Hence the indictment could properly be brought only under the
Bankruptcy Act.
In Kahn v. United States,3 the court said:
"If Congress regarded the crime of false swearing in bank-
ruptcy proceedings as equal in enormity to the crime of per-
jury, what necessity was there for section 29 b (2) at all? The
fact that the word perjury does not appear in the later act and
that the term of imprisonment was reduced from five years to
two years and the $2000 fine omitted altogether makes it clear
that Congress in the Bankruptcy Act was dealing with a crime
not in its judgment so aggravated as the crime of perjury.
69See Ulmerv.U.S. 219 Fed. 641 (I9r5); Williarasv.U.S.x68U.S. 382 (1897).
91Ulmer v. U. S. supra note 89.
K248 Fed. 684, (1918).
"Ibid, at p. 685.
2214 Fed. 54 (1914).
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If this view of the situation be correct it is manifest that the
burden of proof in perjury cases is not applicable here!' 94
In Shonfed v. United States,95 the court said that "false swearing
in bankruptcy is not equal in enormity to the crime of perjury de-
nounced by the general statute."
It would seem to be the law, therefore, that false swearing in
bankruptcy proceedings cannot be punished under section 125 of
the Penal Code of the United States and that whatever punishment
is meted out to the offender is governed by the provisions in the
Bankruptcy Act.9
(v) Subsection (2) applies also to any person who makes a false
account in, or in relation to, any proceedings in bankruptcy. No
case has been found which deals with this matter. The purpose of
the subsection is, however, clear. There must be no interference
with proper proceedings in bankruptcy through the medium of untrue
accounts. The subsection is a general provision, applies to all per-
sons, to all untrue accounts and to all proceedings in bankruptcy.
C. (i) Subsection (3) applies to every person who presents a false
claim for proof against the estate of a bankrupt. No person can pre-
sent such a claim for himself or for another. Nor can he use another
person as his agent, proxy or attorney for the presentation of such
claim.
(ii) The purpose of this subsection is patently to safeguard the
operation of section 57 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act which reads thus:
"Proof of claims shall consist of a statement under oath, in
writing, signed by a creditor setting forth the claim, the con-
sideration therefor, and whether any, and if so what, securities
are held therefor, and whether any, and if so what, payments
have been made thereon, and that the stun claimed is justly
owing from the bankrupt to the creditor."
This is particularly true when it is noticed that the subsection
practically follows the definition of the word "creditor" as given in
section i (9) which states that " 'Creditor' shall include any one who
owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include
his duly authorized agent, attorney, or proxy."
(iii) Only two cases have been found dealing with this subsection.
In Levinson v. United States,97 one L. bought stock in a corporation
which became thereafter bankrupt, and paid for the stock. After
4Ibid, at p. 56; Schonfeld v. U. S. 277 Fed. 934, (1921). See also Gordon v.
U. S. 5 Fed. (2d) 943 (1925).
'277 Fed. 934 (1921).
But see U. S. v. Coyle 229 Fed. 256 (1916), contra.
97263 Fed. 257 (1920).
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the corporation became bankrupt L. filed a claim for the money he
had paid for the stock and stated that he had given the money to the
corporation as a loan. The question was whether such a statement
was the making of a false claim. The court held that it was. In
Lybrand v. United States,9 s and Drafts v. Same,99 which two cases are
inter-related, the facts were rather odd. One R. was a cotton mer-
chant. He issued cotton bills to D. R. became bankrupt on March
30, 1912. In April, 1912, D. filed claims against the estate in bank-
ruptcy based on the cotton bills given him by R. Proper dividends
were given to him which he retained. On August 15, 1918, L. filed
proof of claims with the trustees in bankruptcy of R., in which he
swore that his claim was based on a cotton bill transferred to him
by D. prior to the bankruptcy of R. On August 14, D. made affidavit
to the effect that he had transferred the bill, upon which L. based
his claim, prior to the bankruptcy of R. Both D. and L. are indicted
for making a false claim. The prosecution against D. was based on
the making of the affidavit of August 1918, which the government
claimed was false. The prosecution against L. was based on his
affidavit of August I, I918, which the government claimed was
also false. Both were convicted for making false oaths. The Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained the convictions.100
(iv) A false claim cannot be used in any composition with creditors
either by a person acting for his own benefit or for the benefit of
another. The subsection applies to the one making the claim and
also to any one acting as the claimant's agent, proxy, or attorney.
D. (i) Subsection (4) is exceedingly perplexing. It forbids the receiv-
ing of "any material amount of property from a bankrupt after the
filing of the petition, with intent to defeat" the Bankruptcy Act.
What is meant by "material amount?" Does "material" refer to
quantity, quality or value? Is the standard of measurement to be
total property belonging to the bankrupt's estate or the amounts of
the dividends which the creditors are to receive? Is this subsection
meant to be correlative to subdivision (a) which forbids unlawfully
transferring "any property . . . belonging to a bankrupt estate?"
If so, what is to be done to the word "material?" Is it to be construed
out of the statute? If not did Congress simply mean to call atten-
tion to the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex? No cases have been
269 Fed. 6oi (1920).
Oglbid.10 It is somewhat difficult to understand these cases. The facts are not quite
clear. It seems as though Lybrand should have been indicted for making a false
oath rather than for making a false claim.
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found dealing with this subsection. No text writer seems to have
discussed the matter.'
Perhaps a clue to the meaning of the subsection is found in the
fact that the recipient must have the "intent to defeat" the Bank-
ruptcy Act. It seems as though the Congress intended to deter any
person from assisting in the dispersion of the bankrupt's property
by receiving the property from the bankrupt to the detriment of
the creditors. One of the very important purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act is to secure to the creditors of the bankrupt as much as is possible
of the bankrupt's assets. Any diminution of the bankrupt's assets
effects the creditors adversely. It is submitted, therefore, that, per-
haps, any amount of property which reduces the chances that the
creditors, or any one of them, may have to get full payment of the
debts that are due them, or him, is a "material amount of property."
The test would be this: Is the property received by the accused of
any value whatever to the creditors or any one of them? If so, there
has been the receiving of a "material amount of property." If not,
there has been no receiving of a "material amount of property."
It is to be noted that the offense is not completed unless (a) there
has been a receipt of the property, (b) from the bankrupt (which
means probably from the bankrupt directly or through an agent or
instrumentality of the bankrupt), (c) after the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, (d) with the intent to defeat the Bankruptcy Act,
and (e) that the recipient must have received the property knowingly
and fraudulently.
E. (i) Subsection (5) deals with extortion. It prohibits every one
from extorting or attempting to extort "any money or property from
any person as a consideration for acting or forbearing to act in
bankruptcy proceedings."
(ii) The offense created by this part of the Bankruptcy Act is
different from the Common Law offense of extortion.'10 It may be
committed by any person whether he is an official or not, and whether
he acts under color of his office or not.' °3 Under the Bankruptcy
Act "to extort" means simply "to get." The getting of the money
or property must be compensation for acting or failing to act in
bankruptcy proceedings. The offense, therefore, cannot be com-
mitted unless proceedings in bankruptcy are under way. The extor-
tion must be done knowingly and fraudulently.
101See Black on Bankruptcy page 753; Collier on Bankruptcy, page 569 (Tenth
Edition).102U. S. v. Dunkley, 235 Fed. iooo (I916).103Ibid.
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(iii) Only one case has been found dealing with this part of the
statute. In United States v. Dunkley,1c 4 D. was present at a sale of
the bankrupt's property as an agent of the bankrupt. X. bid $5oo
for the property. D. protested against selling the property for so
little as was bid and succeeded in getting the sale postponed. Then
D. tells X. that he, D., will withdraw his objection to the sale to X.
if X. will give him $5o. X. gives D. the So. D. withdraws his
objection to the sale. The sale is made to X. D. is indicted for
extorting money from X. D. defends on the ground that he was the
legal agent of the bankrupt and had the legal privilege of using his
influence to have the referee reject or accept whatever bids were
made. The question was whether the existence of this legal privilege
was a valid defense to D. The court held that it was not, because
the statute does not say that the forbearing or acting must be un-
lawful. All extortions or attempts at extortion are forbidden.
(iv) As the subsection forbids even attempts at extorting it is
obvious that the act or forbearance for which the consideration was
extorted need never occur.10 5
F. The punishment for violating this subdivision of the statute
is imprisonment for not more than two years.
3
Subdivision "c" is as follows:
"A person shall be punished by a fine, not to exceed five hun-
dred dollars, and forfeit his office, and the same shall thereupon
become vacant, upon conviction of the offense of having know-
ingly (x) acted as a referee in a case in which he is directly or in-
directly interested; or (2) purchased, while a referee, directly or
indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy of which he
is referee; or (3) refused, while a referee or trustee, to permit a
reasonable opportunity for the inspection of the accounts relat-
ing to the affairs of, and the papers and records of, estates in
his charge by parties in interest when directed by the court so to
do."
A. (i) Subsection (i) applies to a referee in bankruptcy proceedings.
Any person who is directly, or indirectly, interested in a given case
cannot be a referee in that case. The purpose of the statute is to
put the bankruptcy proceedings into the hands of one who will not
be swayed in his actions by considerations of self-interest.
The subsection ties in with section 3 9b (i), of the Bankruptcy Act
which says that:
2'Ib v.IMSee Beale; "Criminal Attempts," 16 Harv. L. Rev. 491.
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"Referees shall not (E) act in cases in which they are directly
or indirectly interested."
Under this section it has been held that the interest which will
disqualify a person from acting as a referee is an interest in either the
proceedings in bankruptcy or in the estate of the bankrupt.' That
he is a debtor of the bankrupt does not disqualify him, 0 7 nor does
the fact that he receives fees or commissions as a referee. 08
It would seem, therefore, that the offense cannot be committed
unless the person who acts as a referee knows that he has a pecuniary
and personal interest in the proceedings, or the outcome of the pro-
ceedings, or the estate of the bankrupt.0 9
B. (i) Subsection (2) is directed against referees. They areprohibited
from purchasing, either directly or indirectly, any property of the
estate in bankruptcy in which they are acting.
This subsection is directly connected with Section 39b (3) which
states that referees shall not "purchase, directly or indirectly, any
property of the estate in bankruptcy."
There have been no cases found dealing with this subsection but
its provisions and purpose are perfectly clear.
C. (i) Subsection (3) deals with both trustees and referees. It
prohibits them from arbitrarily preventing parties interested in the
bankruptcy proceedings or the property of the bankrupt from examin-
ing the accounts, papers and records of the estate and the proceed-
ings. The referee and trustee are safeguarded from petty annoyances,
and intermeddling, by the provisions that there must be a court order
directing that the opportunity to examine the records, etc., and that
the referee or trustee must know that the court order has been issued.
This subsection is obviously related to Section 39a (3) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act which states that one of the duties of the referee is to
"(3) Furnish such information concerning the estates in
process of administration before them as may be requested by
the parties in interest."
and to Section 47a (5) which says that one of the duties of the trustee
shall be to
"(5) Furnish such information concerning the estates of which
they are trustees and their administration as may be requested
by parties in interest."
It also relates to Section 49a which provides that
'O0Bray v. Cobb, 91 Fed. 102 (1898).
oI7bM.
108In re Strobel 155 Fed. 692 (1907); In re Abbey Press, 134 Fed. 51, (1904).
See also note to In re Gardner, 4 Amer. Bank. Rep. 42o.10 Compare Black on Bankruptcy p. 22 with Collier on Bankruptcy p. 603(Tenth Edition).
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"The accounts and papers of trustees shall be open to the
inspection of officers and all parties in interest."
(ii) The foregoing provisions are eminently sensible and practicable.
Proceedings in bankruptcy are primarily for the benefit of the
creditors of the bankrupt. The referee and trustee are officers ap-
pointed for the purpose of aiding the creditors in getting what is
their due. The creditors are fairly entitled to be informed of the
processes of the administration of the bankrupts estate and to be
watchful of their own interests. The creditors must keep their
desire for information within reasonable bounds and not unneces-
sarily interfere with the administration of the estate in bankruptcy.
But the referee or trustee must not act in any arbitrary fashion. To
do so would be to interfere with one of the functions of the proceed-
ings. If he is arbitrary and refuses to obey the orders of the court
he is not only fined five hundred dollars but is automatically removed
from office at the moment of his conviction.
No cases have been found dealing with this subsection.
4
Subdivision "d"-"A person shall not be prosecuted for any
offense arising under this Act unless the indictment is found or
the information is filed in court within one year after the com-
mission of the offense."
A. (i) This subdivision of the Bankruptcy Act is directed against the
federal prosecuting authorities. It prevents them from bringing any
prosecution later than one year after the offense has been committed.
The important question is this; When has each of the offenses enu-
merated in the Bankruptcy Act been committed?
(ii) Offenses may consist of acts or omissions. If an offense con-
sists of an act which has been forbidden, the offense "is committed"
at the time that the act is done. If an offense consists of an omission,
that is, of the failure to do that which the law requires should be
done, the offense "is committed" at the moment the duty to act
rests upon the offender and during every moment of time that the
duty continues to rest upon him. So long as the duty to do remains,
the failure to do is an offense.
B. (i) The offenses enumerated in subdivision "a" are allacts. They
are committed when they are "knowingly and fraudulently" done.
At that moment the statute of limitations begins to run.
(ii) The offense of concealment of property belonging to the estate
in bankruptcy which is denounced by subdivision "b," subsection (i)
may be either an act or an omission.
If the offender secretes, or falsifies or mutilates the property the
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offense is committed at the moment of secreting, falsification or
mutilation. The statute of limitations begins to run from that mo-
ment. But if the offender fails to reveal the existence or the where-
abouts of the property the offense consists of an omission. The
duty to reveal does not cease until revelation is made. The statute
of limitations will not begin to run until the last moment of the time
when the duty ceases to exist.
When does the duty to reveal cease? Certainly not when the bank-
rupt receives his discharge in bankruptcy. The statute is explicit in
saying that the offense can be committed after discharge in bank-
ruptcy. The duty must continue until such time as the entire pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy are ended, the trustee in bankruptcy makes
his final report and the trustee is discharged. The statute of limita-
tions begins to run from the time that the trustee in bankruptcy is
discharged from his duties.
In Johnson v. United States, 110 a bankrupt was indicted for conceal-
ing some assets from his trustee in bankruptcy. He omitted putting
the property on his schedule of assets and liabilities. The question
was whether the offense was consummated when the assets were
omitted from the schedule. The court held that it was not, saying,
"The offense is not making a misrepresentation at a given time
and place; it is the continuous concealment of the property
from the trustee during the whole course of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings or beyond. The omission from the schedule would
have amounted to nothing if the bankrupt had disclosed the
property to the trustee."''
The court was, obviously, dealing with "conceal" as meaning "duty
to reveal." It was quite right, therefore, in saying that the offense
was not over when the assets were omitted from the schedule. The
duty to reveal continues to the end of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
In Warren v. United States,2 however, the court was operating
with a different meaning of "conceal" and reached a different result.
In that case W. disposed of some fertilizer and barbed wire that
belonged to him in September or October of i9o8. On November i8,
x9o8 W. filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, made schedules
and was adjudicated a bankrupt. Thereafter he does nothing more.
On December i8, i9o9, that is more than twelve months after filing
of petition in bankruptcy, and also more than twelve months after
the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy, he was indicted for
110163 Fed. 30 (I908).
luIbid, at p. 33.
112199 Fed. 753 (1912).
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concealing assets. The indictment charged a continuous conceal-
ment of the assets. W. set up the statute of limitations as a defense.
The question was whether the statute of limitations had run against
the offense or not. The court held that it had as the offense was
completed when the trustee was appointed and took title to the
property. It further held that the fact that the property, once con-
cealed, remained concealed was immaterial. There could be no
continuous concealment. The court looked to the time when the
bankrupt secreted his property and held that that time was when the
statute began to run.
These two cases are, therefore, not in conflict. The courts are
dealing with different meanings of the word "conceal." Both decisions
are correct. The first looks to the failure to reveal, an omission. The
second looks to the secreting, an act.
Two other cases are of value in this connection though they deal
with the problem of jurisdiction over the offense of concealing assets.
In Gretsch v. United States,"' G. and B. entered into a partnership
to trade in jewelry. B. was a resident of New Jersey. G. resided in
New York. The salesrooms were in New York. A safe containing
some of the assets were in New York. They filed a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy in New Jersey but did not include all their assets.
Among the omitted assets were the jewels in the safe in New York.
These jewels had never been in New Jersey. G. and B. were indicted
for concealing assets from their trustee in bankruptcy. The indict-
ment was brought in New Jersey. The question was whether the
New Jersey courts had jurisdiction over the offense as the goods had
never been in New Jersey. The court held that it had not and that
the indictment violated Amendment VI of the Federal Constitution.114
The court said:
"Concealment is a positive thing committed at some time or
other with respect to a physical thing. It must, therefore, be
done somewhere, and wherever done in violation of the statute,
there and there alone has the court jurisdiction of the offense." 5
The court further held that the offense was not committed when the
assets were omitted from the schedule.
The court was right. It was using the word "conceal" to mean
"secrete." That act occurred in New York. The act was outside
the jurisdiction of the courts in New Jersey.
13231 Fed. 57 (I916).
iliThis provides for trial by jury "of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed."
'1231 Fed. 57 at p. 59.
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The same court that decided the Gretsch case also decided the case
of Glass v. United States."6 In that case G. was a merchant in New
Jersey. He had a storeroom in New York. He became insolvent.
He is threatened with bankruptcy proceedings by his creditors. He
removes his books and some property from New Jersey to the store-
room in New York. Then his creditors petition him into involuntary
bankruptcy. G. does not give his books and property which he had
taken to New York to his trustee in bankruptcy. He is indicated in
New Jersey for concealing some of his assets in bankruptcy. He
pleads to the jurisdiction of the court but the court held that it had
jurisdiction. The court says that there was a continuous concealment
of the goods and that the concealment occurred in New Jersey, when
the goods were physically converted in New Jersey, and carried off
to New York. The Gretsch case is distinguished away.
The court was right in this case, also, it is submitted. It was
looking at the duty to reveal. That continued throughout the
bankruptcy proceedings. The duty existed in New Jersey. Failure
to fulfill that duty occurred in New Jersey. Hence the New Jersey
courts had jurisdiction over the offense. The statute of limitations
would run in New York from the time the goods were secreted there,
but it would begin to run in New Jersey from the time that the duty
to reveal ceased legally to exist.
(iii) The offenses enumerated in subdivision "b" subsections (2),
(3), (4), and (5) are all acts. The statute of limitations begins to
run when the accused has "knowingly and fraudulently" committed
the act.
(iv) Subdivision "c" deals entirely with acts. The offense is
committed when the act is "knowingly" done. The statute of
limitations begins to run from that time.
116231 Fed. 65 (I916).
